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SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, FIRST DEPARTMENT
December 2020 Term
Cooper, J.P., Higgitt, McShan, JJ.
Durst Pyramid, LLC,
NY County Clerk’s No.
Petitioner-Landlord-Respondent, 570107/20
-againstKevin Griffin,
Respondent-Tenant-Appellant.

Calendar Nos.
20-165/166

Tenant appeals from two orders of the Civil Court of the
City of New York, New York County (Timmie Erin Elsner, J.),
each entered on or about January 15, 2020, after a hearing,
which granted landlord’s motion to enforce a stipulation of
settlement in a holdover summary proceeding and conditionally
stayed execution of the warrant for five months.
Per Curiam.
Orders (Timmie Erin Elsner, J.), entered on or about
January 15, 2020, affirmed, with one bill of $10 costs.
The evidence adduced at the hearing supports Civil
Court’s determination that tenant breached the two-attorney,
so-ordered stipulation settling the underlying holdover
proceeding (see Hotel Cameron, Inc. v Purcell, 35 AD3d 153,
155 [2006]).

The unrebutted evidence, fairly interpreted,

established that tenant violated the term of the stipulation

that required him to refrain from “harassing other tenants
in the building, following them and/or making them feel
uncomfortable and fear for their safety,” by engaging in
various episodes of antisocial behavior during the
probationary term including “sp[itting] at,” lurking,
whistling and following a female tenant as she exited the
building and approaching her so closely that his “face could
have touched her face” (see Domen Holding Co. v Aranovich,
1 NY3d 117, 124-125 [2003]).

Contrary to tenant’s claim,

a fair interpretation of the evidence supports the conclusion
that the breach was substantial. Additionally, the loss of
possession of the premises is not a forfeiture. Rather, it
is “the contracted-for . . . consequence of the tenant[’s]
own failure to do that which [he] promised to do” (1029 Sixth
v Riniv Corp., 9 AD3d 142, 150 [2004], lv dismissed 4 NY3d
795 [2005]).
We do not find that there was any error warranting
reversal when the court refused to hear the testimony of
tenant’s social worker, who, according to the offer of proof,
had no knowledge of tenant’s compliance with the stipulation
or any of the incidents underlying landlord’s case in chief.
Rather, the social worker’s testimony was offered regarding
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the “effect an eviction would have on [tenant’s] life,” and,
in the event the Court ruled in favor of landlord, the “length
of the stay the Court would grant.”

Most significantly, while

declining to hear the social worker’s testimony at the
hearing, the Court indicated that if it ultimately ruled that
tenant breached the stipulation, it would invite submission
of papers as to the length of the stay, including an affidavit
from the social worker, and tenant’s counsel voiced no
objection to this procedure.
In any event, even assuming there was error, we find the
error harmless in the particular circumstances of this case,
since an extended stay was granted, tenant is still in
possession and a motion is presently pending in Civil Court
seeking a determination as to whether tenant is entitled to
an extended or permanent stay of the warrant of eviction or
a “reasonable accommodation” based upon an alleged mental
disability (see Matter of Prospect Union Assoc. v DeJesus,
167 AD3d 540, 543 [2018]).
We have considered tenant’s remaining contentions and
find them unavailing.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.
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I concur

I concur

I concur
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